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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RULON BRERETON, 
VS. 
RALPH DIXON, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
CASE 
NO. 10,637 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action in negligence fol' claimed damages to 
part of a three acre orchard by reason of a grass fire caused 
by the escape of a rubbish fire built by defendant in con-
nection with construction work. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in 
favor of plaintiff in the amount of $5,700.00. 
NATURE OF REIJFJF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appeUant seeks a new trial solely upon the 
question of damages, on the theory that the trial court im-
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properly admitted evidence and improperly instructed the 
Jury on the question of damages. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Paintiff-respondent is the owner of a three acre fruit 
farm adjacent to his home in north Provo (R. 132, 145-6). 
In March, 1963, defendant was engaged in construction of 
a fire station for Provo City Corporation on property nea:r 
the plaintiff's orchard (R. 112). In order to C0111Struct the 
fire station, defendant was required to destroy an old build-
ing on the City's property. In connection with such dem~ 
lition, defendant and his agents undertook to burn the ta:r 
paper and refuse from the old building (R. 113). These 
materials were burned intermittently during the day of 
March 22, 1963, and the morning of March 23, 1963. At 
around noon of Marcil 23, a wind came up from the south, 
the fire escaped to dry grass north of the fire station and 
spread northward through· intervening land and into plain-
tiff's orchard before it could be brought under control (R. 
2'77-289). 
The orchard consisted of alternate pear and peach 
trees, :approximately twenty rows of trees each (R. 159). 
The grass fire went along part of six rows 1and a part of 
the seventh (R. 159). There is conflict in plaintiff's own 
evidence as to the extent of damage, if any, to the trees. 
If this were the only question, this appeal '\Vould nort have 
been taken. 
Plaintiff Rulon Brereton ic; an employee at U. S. Steel 
Corporation. ·The orchard is a three-acre family operated 
side-line with plaintiff (R. 145-6). 
The jury by its verdict found that the fire was caused 
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at least in part by negligence of the defendant and his 
agents, and defendant does not attack this finding. By 
this appeal, defendant seeks review only of the theory up-
on which the trial court admitted evidence and submitted 
the case to the jury on the issue of damages. 
It is remembered that the grass fire did not destroy 
the orchard. I:t went through about one acre, covering 
six and part of a seventh row, part of a twenty row orchard 
(R. 159). There is a conflict of evidence as to the extent 
of damage to the trees in the burned area, such conflict 
showing even in plaintiff's evidence (R. 133, 142, 159-164, 
314, 324-330). 
The eITOrs claimed by defendant are that the trial 
court, over objection, admitted evidence of the value of 
each tree, independent of the land or the orchard as a 
whole, and gave an instruction, No. 21, (R. 44) stating in 
part: 
" .. In determining the plaintiff's damages, if any, 
you may consider the reasonable value of the growing 
trees upon the premises at the time of their destruc-
tion; in other words, you should award suoh a sum as 
will fairly and reasonably compensate the owner for 
being deprived of the trees for their intended use; in 
this regard you should consider What they were worth 
on the premises in their growing state at the time of 
injury or destruction." 
The trial court refused to give defendant's requested 
instruction No. 12 (R. 81) and No. 17 (R. 68), patterned 
upon Jury Instruction Forms, Utah, 90.1, 90.40 and 90.44, 
which we take to be the proper meastll'E' of damages in 
this jurisdiction. 
4 
The theory of damages thus submitted is, we believe, 
error requiring reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY AND OVER 
OBJECTION ADMITTED EVIDENCE AS TO THE VAL-
UE OF TREES INDEPENDENT OF THlE LAND OR 
ORCHARD. 
We take the proper rule of law as to damages to be 
as stated in A.L.I. "Restatement of the Law ill Torts," 
§ 929: 
"Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm 
to land resulting from a past invasion and not amount-
ing to a total destruction in value, the damages include 
compensation for 
(a) at the plaintiff's election 
(i) the difference between the value of the 
land before the harm and the value after the harm 
or cost of restoration which has been or may be rea-
sonably incurred, ·or 
(ii) if a separable portion of the land has 
been damaged the loss of its value, and 
(b) the loss of use of the land, and 
( c) discomfort and annoyance, in an action 
brought by the occupant." 
We believe this State is committed to that rule. Park 
v~ Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Ut. 339, 241 P. 2d 914, and Jury 
Instruction Forms, Utah, No. 90.40. 
There is some confusion in the cases on the applica-
tion of the rule as respect growing crops and trees. The 
Supreme Court of Utah has ruled on the question of grow-
ing crops in the case of Cleary v. Shand, 48 Utah 640, 161 
Pac. 453. We have found no Utah cases touching upon 
the rule as applied to trees, timber and the like. 
We believe the distinction to be clearly stated in com-
ment on clause (a) (ii), A.L.I. "Hstatement of the Law of 
Torts", § 929, from Which we quote: 
"The value of a growing crop at the time of injury or 
destruction is the value of the yield which at that time 
would reasonably have been anticipated, less the pros-
pective cost of further cultivation and marketing and 
a deduction for such hazards as hail and flood. With 
reference to many things, however, such as hedges, 
wells, fruit trees, and immature timber trees, it is im-
practicable to establish a separate value and the owners 
loss can only be measured by the diminution in the 
exchange value of the land or in its value to the 
owner." (Emphasis added) 
This rule was awlied in the case of Cities Service Gas 
Co. v. Christen, (Okla.) 340 P.2d 929, on the destruction of 
pecan trees, in the case of Lawson v. Helmich, (Wash.) 146 
P. 2d 537, on the cutting of apple trees, and in the case of 
Hill v. Morrison, (Calif.) 263 Pac. 573, on ,the injury to fruit 
trees by cattle. 
We quote from Hill v. Morrison, supra: 
"This worth, of course, related to the added worth of 
the ground with the trees, over the worth of the ground 
without the trees, was a proper method of detennin-
ing the damages. (Cases cited) Since the method used 
considered the value of the trees as fruit producers, 
it follows that an added sum for the crop itself would 
have been counting the damage twice and hence the 
allegation in the complaint referring to fruit as a.r1 
addEd damage is pure surplusage". 
We believe the rule to b~ well stated in Annotation, 
"Measure of Damages for Destruction of or Injury to Trees 
and Shrubbery," 69 ALR 2d 1335, page 1365: 
"In a great majority of case3 the Courts have held that 
proper measure of damages for the destruction of or 
injury to fruit, nut, or other productive trees is the 
difference in value of the land uporn which the trees 
stood just before and just afte~ the injury or destruc-
tion." 
We take the liberty of quoting from a case cited at the 
trial in support of his position by plaintiff, Ratkins v. Moun-
tain Home Coop. Irr. Co., 33 Idaho 623, 197 Pac. 247: 
"The measure of damages for the destruction orf trees 
for want of water is what suoh trees were worth on 
the premises in their growmg state at the time of their 
destruction, 'and in determining that question there 
may be taken into consideration the cliffo.rence in value 
of the land immediately before the trees were planted 
and the value of the land after the trees were planted, 
which increase in value results by reason of the value 
of the trees in a growing condition." 
Over defendant's objection, plaintiff was permitted to 
answer the question: "Mr. Breretoo, do you have, based 
upon your expeTience and the fact that you ol\Vll the or-
chard, do you have a judgment as to the value of a pear 
tree, one single pear tree, that was damaged in your or-
chard, or destroyed in your orchard?" (R. 150-152). Plain-
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tiff was allowed to place before the jury a claimed value of 
$200.00 for each pear tree and $150.00 for each peach tree. 
This did~ include the land on which the tree stood (R. 
191-2). 
On cross examination it was developed that he arrived 
at these figures by a calculated profit in the future, not 
based upon his actual past earnings from the orchard, of 
which he had little admitted, and records of none (R. 70 ff). 
The trial court then ordered Mr. Brereton's testimony 
sb'kken (R. 195) but thereafter showed a misconception 
of the measure of damages by remarking to counsel, before 
the jury: "Yoo likely have here several experts who kno~ 
what a tree of this age and type is worth. Why don't you 
just call them and ask them?" (Emphasis added) (R 
197). 
Plaintiff's counsel then did that, and over objection Mr. 
Vern Stratton was allowed to testify to the same value 
per tree (R. 201-202). Counsel was then compelled by 
cross examination to develop the bases used for these val-
ues: 
"Q (By Mr. Sorensen) Would you give us a break 
down on how you arrive at that $200.00 figure? How 
do you arrive at each of these figures, please? 
"A I would be glad to. If we could break it down to 
say one tree on a one tree basis-
"Q -You gave the answer. I want you to explain 
how you arrived at it. 
"A All right. It will take 10 years to replace that 
tree to the productivity that it was at the time that 
it was destroyed. During those 10 years that it will 
take to replace the tree, those trees - let's take a pear 
tree first: that pear tree will produce approximately 
10 bushels of pears each year. Selling the pears as this 
orchard would have done, he would sell them for from 
$2.75 to $3.00 a bushel. It will cost him $.75 to $1.00 
a bushel to grow, to spray, and to harvest, and in the 
pursuit of taking care of this fruit, leaving a net profit 
of approximately $2.00 a bushel, which times 10 is 
$20.00 per year times 10 is $200.00. 
"Q And you are assuming that the tree would produce 
every year? 
"A Weather permitting. 
"Q You are assuming that there are no complete wipe-
outs frost-wise? 
"A We very seldom have complete destruction. 
"Q You are assuming not a major slump in the mar-
ket price, aren't you? 
"A I am assuming that it doesn't increase, which I 
think it is. 
"Q And you are assuming a constant labor supply at 
a fixed price, are you not? 
"A I don't think the labor will be any problem on a 
small orchard. 
"Q You are assuming that the labor supply costs would 
remain constant, are you not? 
"A I am assuming that the costs will remain as con-
stant as of the price he received for it. If the costs 
increase, then also will his gross profit increase, be--
cause he will receive more for his fruit. 
"Q And what about taxes? 
"A This is one of the costs. 
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"Q And you are assuming that that will remain con-
stant? 
"A No. I say, as they increase so will his profit in-
crease, because he will get more out of his fruit." 
We respectfully submit that this is the very evil dis-
cussed in 25 C.J.S. 615, "Damages," §85c: 
"It is also competent, in addition to showing the value 
of a farm before and after the injury to the trees, to 
offer testimony as to the income from the orchard for 
several years prior to the injury, but evidence of the 
amount of fruit trees of like nature would produce in 
a seasonable year and the market value thereof has 
been condemned as too uncertain." 
Another witness, Mr. Clarence D. Ashton, a friend and 
relative of plaintiff, was allowed, over objection, to testify 
to the life expectancy of a pear tree (R. 213). Again~ over 
objection, he was allowed to testify to the value of a tree 
as a tree and independent of the land (R. 220-224), and de-
fendant could give no bases of any substance as to haw th~ 
arrived at these values (R. 224-230). 
Though it dealt with the question of damage to grow-
ing annual crops, and not trees, the case of Cleary v. Shand, 
151 Pac. 453, 48 Utah 640, contains the best statement pos-
sible of the basis for our claim of error. In that cmse Jus-
tice Straup stated: 
" . The vice of such questions is not only to per-
mit the witness to invade the province of the jury, but 
also that he, in answering them, may adopt a rule, or 
consider an element of damage, beyond the legal meas-
ure. . We do not take kindly to the views ex-
pressed by some courts that, if the witness, in fixing 
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the runount of damage in such case, adopts or con-
siders an element beyond the legal measure, the mat-
ter may be taken care of on cross-examination. The 
competency of direct testimony should not be made 
to depend upon the ability or skill of the cross-exam-
iner to weed out the improper from the proper ele--
ments considered by the witness. It is weight, but not 
competency, of evidence which may thus be tested." 
We believe no competent evidence as to the measure 
of damages was presented. Plaintiff had no record of pro-
fitable operation of the orchard before the fire (R. 171-
174). Plaintiff offered no evidence touching directly or 
indirectly on the respective values of the orchard, as an or-
chard, before or after the fire, and when defendant ques-
tioned plaintiff on these values, he did not know (R. 292-
305). 
We respectfully submit that the trial court erred in 
admitting incompetent evidence on the measure of dam-
ages, and that this eTror could not 1be cured by cross-exam-
ination, without regard to the degree of competence of the 
cross-examiner. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUcrED 
THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF DAMAGES. 
Defendant requested the court to give the following 
instructions on the measure of damages (R. 81; R. 68): 
"DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
12. 
"If you find the issues in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, it will be your duty to award 
the plaintiff such damages, if any, as you may find 
11. 
from a preponderance of the evidence will fairly and 
adequately compensate him for any injury and dam-
age he has sustained as a proximate result of the de-
f endant' s negligence complained of by him. 
"In awarding such damages you should award him such 
~um as will reasonably compensate the plaintiff for 
damages to his property as a proximate result of in-
jury by the plaintiff. 
"That sum is equal to the fair market value of the prop-
erty immediately before and immediately after the in-
jury. If the property is capable of restoration to its 
fair market value as it existed immediately before the 
injury at an expense 'less than the difference in value, 
then the measure of damages is the e~ of such 
restoration rather than such difference in value. 
"The amount of damages thus assessed for all the fore-
going must not exceed the sum of $20,000.00, the 
amount plaintiff prays for in his complaint." (R. 81) 
"DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
17. 
"The measure of value of the property is the fair mar-
ket value at the time and place of the damage. This 
is defined as the price at which a person having some-
thing which he desires to sell but is not under compul-
sion to sell could and would sell the :property to a. per.; 
son who desired to buy but was under no compulsion to 
buy." (R. 68) 
These requested instructions are from Jury Instruc-
tion Forms, Utah, Nos. 90.1, 90.40, and 90.44. These, we 
believe, accurately state the law of this jurisdiction. They 
are founded on the case of Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., sup-
ra. ~he trial court refused these requests. Exception to 
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this refusal was taken ( R. 270) , and a motion for a new 
trial, denied by the court, was made thereon (R. 89). 
Instead, the trial court gave only the following instruc. 
ti on on the measure of damages ( R. 44) : 
"No. 20 
"You are instructed that if you find the issues in favor 
of the plaintiff on his complaint and against tlhe de-
fendant, it will be your duty to award the plaintiff 
such damages, if any, as you find from a preponder-
ance of the evidence will fairly and adequately com-
pensate him for any damage he has sustained as a prox. 
imate result of the defendant's negligence. 
"In determining the plaintiff's damages, if any, you m::iy 
consider the reasonable value of the growing trees up. 
on the premises at the time of their destruction; in 
other words, you should award such a sum as will fairly 
and reasonably compensate the owner for being de· 
prived of the trees for their intended use; in this re-
gard you should consider what they were worth on the 
premises in their growing state at the time of injury 
or destruction. 
"The amount of damages thus assessed must not ex· 
ceed the sum of $20,000.00, the amount the plaintiff 
prays for in his complaint." 
We believe this instruction, when applied to the inad· 
missible evidence presented to the jury as discussed under 
Point I of this brief, constitutes prejudicial error. Our au· 
thority for and reasoning supporting this position are the 
same as for Point I. 
Under this instruction, the jury was directed to con-
sider what the owner claimed to have invested in the trees, 
uncertain as it was, hypothetical evidence a<; to what a 
peach tree a:nd pear tree might produce, speculative as this 
may be, and bald unsupported testimony that such tree was 
w 011:h so many dollars, all independent of the land, vagaries 
tif weather and market, , and without regard to actual pro-
duction of that particular orchard, a subject vague indeed 
to the plaintiff. This, we submit, was error warranting a 
new tl'ial, wherein a proper basis of damages may be pre-
sented. 
CONCLUSION 
This case gives rise to an interesting proposition. Ac-
cording to the record-and we accept these figures----if pear 
trees are planted on twenty foot centers, ooe would have 
about 108 trees per acre. At $200.00 per pear tree, a ten 
year old orchard would be, on the evidence herein admitted 
and the theory submitted to the jury, worth $21,600.00 per 
acre, exclusive of the value of the land. Add to this a 
hundred peach trees interspersed in this orchard, with a 
value of $150.00 each, and the proposition becomes inter-
esting indeed. Under the rulings of the trial court and the 
instructions given 1and refused, a jury might have awarded 
plaintifif $24,100.00 for one acre of orchard, and the plantJiff 
keep the land! This should be of interest to the State 
Highway Department and other entities who exercise the 
power of eminent domain. 
We respectfully assert rt:hat the evidence erroneously 
admitted and error in instructing the jury oo damages re-
sulted in a verdict punitive to the defendant rather than 
compensatory to the plaintiff, and that defendant should, 
therefore, be granted a new trial on the issue of damages. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, JR. 
